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In this paper we examine the cross-sectional determinants of idiosyncratic volatility of 
biotech IPO firms. We extend current research in two directions. First, we test whether CEO 
stock options impact on idiosyncratic volatility. Second, we test new hypotheses that relate 
some easily identifiable managerial characteristics to idiosyncratic volatility. We find that the 
CEO stock options, resource dependence capabilities, and the age of board members help 
predict idiosyncratic volatility. Our results are robust for the various measures of 
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Determinants of Idiosyncratic Volatility for Biotech IPO Firms 
 
The idiosyncratic volatility of individual stocks is important in both theory and 
practice, so it is beneficial to study the factors that help predict idiosyncratic volatility. 
However, although there are studies that relate firm-specific factors to idiosyncratic volatility, 
we know of no other study that examines the relation between managerial characteristics and 
idiosyncratic volatility.  
Using a sample of biotech IPO firms, we investigate cross-sectionally whether or not 
managerial characteristics and executive stock options affect idiosyncratic volatility. We 
examine whether managerial characteristics, such as the age of senior managers, founder-
CEO status, or the professional backgrounds of directors, can help predict idiosyncratic 
volatility. These characteristics are important, because they may directly affect a firm’s 
management style, risk averseness, and corporate behavior.  
We develop and test hypotheses relating these managerial characteristics to 
idiosyncratic volatility. Using the "Upper Echelon" theory, we present our managerial 
characteristics hypotheses including the resource dependency hypothesis, which states that in 
a nationally regulated industry, the proportion of corporate elites with a legal and regulatory 
background should be negatively associated with idiosyncratic volatility. Other managerial 
characteristics hypotheses state that the CEO’s age and the existence of a founder-CEO are 
also associated with idiosyncratic volatility. 
We also examine the relation between stock options and idiosyncratic volatility 
because there are different predictions in the literature and no empirical work has been 
performed on these predictions. Specifically, Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) 
suggests that idiosyncratic volatility should be positively associated with executive stock 
options as they encourage managers to take risks. Conversely, executive stock options might 
not be effective given that executives’ human capital is already tied up with the firm. Our 
empirical tests on the relation between stock options and idiosyncratic volatility are intended 
to shed light on these predictions. 
Our sample of IPO firms in the biotech industry offers a unique information 
environment that facilitates the study. First, the firms at different developmental stages may 
exhibit different idiosyncratic volatility (Pastor and Veronesi, 2003). By focusing on the IPO, 
we can control the possible lifecycle effect on idiosyncratic volatility. In contrast, although 
many investors are interested in IPOs, little information is available for these firms. This is 
because IPO firms tend to be small with little publicly available information before listing. 
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This is especially true for high-tech IPO firms for which the traditional accounting data, such 
as earnings, total assets, and sales, are often not very meaningful. Therefore, our easily 
identifiable managerial characteristics may be more helpful in predicting idiosyncratic 
volatility for these IPO firms. In addition, an IPO firm is less likely to have CEO or board 
member changes within one year after their listings, which greatly facilitates our analysis.  
Second, prior research suggests that idiosyncratic volatility is positively associated 
with high-tech firms, especially after their IPOs (Campbell et al., 2001 and Pastor and 
Veronesi, 2002). By examining IPO firms in the high-tech industries, it would help detect the 
possible factors that have an impact on idiosyncratic volatility. Note that even high-tech 
industries can differ in character (McGahan and Porter, 1997). Due to the fact that the 
resource dependency hypothesis requires us to study a nationally regulated industry, we 
decided to restrict our study to a single industry. The biotech industry, when compared to the 
semiconductor, the computer and telecommunications, and the internet industries, is heavily 
regulated by the relevant government agencies such as FDA.  
It is pertinent to note that a high percentage of these biotech firms have stock option 
plans. This helps test the possible relation between stock options and idiosyncratic volatility. 
Without exception, the newly listed biotech firms in our sample do not issue dividends, 
which can reduce the confounding effect in the tests. Finally, biotech firms have attracted 
extensive attention in the market (Robbins-Roth, 2001).  
Our major results indicate that managerial characteristics, such as the proportion of 
corporate elites with legal and regulatory background, and the average age of board members, 
can help predict idiosyncratic volatility. In addition, stock options are positively related to 
idiosyncratic volatility. These findings have important implications to both researchers and 
practitioners. 
  The next section develops our testing hypotheses. Section III describes data and 
methodology, and Section IV presents empirical results. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. Hypothesis Development 
 
We specify out hypotheses in this section. 
 
A. Stock Options Hypothesis 
Cohen, Hall, and Viceira (2000) find a positive association between stock return 
volatility and executive stock options. Campbell et al. (2001) interpret this finding as 
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informal evidence that stock options might encourage senior managers to align themselves 
with shareholders’ interests and take more risks. They suggest that executive stock options 
should be positively associated with idiosyncratic volatility. Thus, we develop our first 
hypothesis, which states that: 
 
H1: CEO stock options are positively associated with idiosyncratic volatility. 
 
On the other hand, it could be argued that executive stock options are not associated 
with idiosyncratic volatility. Since by definition a CEO’s nondiversifiable human capital is 
tied to the firm the CEO serves, a further grant of stock options to the CEO will make the 
CEO’s personal portfolio less diversified, and thus, less effective. The higher the 
idiosyncratic volatility of the firm, the less effective are the stock options. Therefore, we have 
the competing hypothesis: 
 
H1a: CEO stock options are not associated with idiosyncratic volatility. 
 
B. Managerial Characteristics Hypotheses 
As noted earlier, because the characteristics of corporate elites could be proxies for 
certain managerial decisions, activities, or behaviors (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), there is a 
need to examine the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and managerial 
characteristics.  As documented, managerial investment decisions (Hamao et al., 2003), 
disclosure decisions (Johnson and Marietta-Westberg, 2003), and more focused business 
strategies (Campbell et al., 2001) can all affect idiosyncratic volatility. 
According to the Upper Echelon theory, the demographic variables of top managers 
can predict their strategic choices because the organization reflects its top managers. Prior 
research suggests that the age of the top management team could be negatively related to risk 
taking. For example, Vroom and Pahl (1971) and Hitt and Tyler (1991) find a negative 
relation between age and risk-taking by managers. There is evidence that senior managers are 
more cautious because they seek additional information and take more time before making 
decisions (Taylor, 1975). Upper Echelon theorists also hypothesize that junior managers 
prefer growth strategies (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
As a corollary, two different studies find that the age of top management team 
members is negatively associated with strategic change (Grimm and Smith, 1991; and 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). For this reason, it is likely that the CEO’s age or the average 
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age of board members may be a proxy for risk aversion. On the other hand, Golden and Zajac 
(2001) find that the average age of board members is positively related to strategic change. 
These authors conclude that to impel strategic change, board members must have sufficient 
capabilities, experience, and confidence. These characteristics are most commonly found in 
boards with more senior members. Thus, it is likely that as a CEO’s age or the average age of 
board members increases, their risk aversion may decrease. This implies that only 
experienced leaders dare to take big risks.  
The two proxies we use in this study are the CEO’s age and the average age of board 
members. The basic hypothesis for CEO age is: 
 
H2: The CEO’s age or the average age of board members is negatively associated with 
idiosyncratic volatility. 
 
The competing hypothesis is: 
 
H2a: The CEO’s age or the average age of board members is positively associated with 
idiosyncratic volatility. 
 
Founder management style may involve more risky decisions and lower levels of 
information disclosures. Research finds that founder-CEOs make more nondiversifying or 
less diversifying acquisitions than do non-founder CEOs (Falenbrach, 2003). This is because 
founder CEOs are specialists who acquire firms that correspond to their specific skill set 
(May, 1995). Falenbrach also finds that a founder CEO invests more in R&D and has higher 
capital expenditures, investing about 1% more of the total assets in R&D each year. Their 
firms also have 0.75% higher capital expenditures than does the median firm in its industry. 
For this reason, we hypothesize that: 
 
H3: Founder management style (Founder-CEO status) is positively associated with 
idiosyncratic volatility. 
 
Conversely, founder CEOs might be less likely to disclose information, as they do not 
behave like the employee-fiduciary agent. Schrand and Verrecchia (2004) find that 
underpricing is negatively associated with information disclosures, which suggests that 
underpricing is a cost of capital directly attributable to managerial choices on information 
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disclosures. Parallel to this, Certo, Covin, Daily, and Dalton (2001) report that the existence 
of founder CEOs in young entrepreneurial firms is positively related to underpricing. The 
outcome suggests that founder managers prefer to disclose less information. Because 
idiosyncratic volatility implies more firm-specific information is impounded into stock 
prices, we develop the following competing hypothesis:  
     
H3a: Founder management style (Founder-CEO status) is negatively associated with 
idiosyncratic volatility. 
 
C. Resource Dependence hypothesis 
 We base our Resource Dependence hypothesis on social theory. It is particularly 
relevant to the biotech industry because it is nationally regulated. The Resource Dependency 
theory states that for an organization to survive, it must be able to acquire resources from the 
environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). To do this, an organization must follow a strategy 
of cooptation. For example, when the University of California appropriates resources from 
the U.S. government by complying with certain White House educational objectives, it is 
following a strategy of cooptation, known as the Resource Dependency theory.  
 In a study of corporate boards, Pfeffer (1972) hypothesizes that the percentage of 
lawyers on a corporate board will be higher when the firm’s industry is nationally regulated. 
This is because the regulatory influence comes out of Washington and is more legalistic and 
formal. This necessitates the services of lawyers. Further, Pfeffer hypothesizes that the 
percentage of lawyers on a corporate board will be positively related to the firm’s need to 
access external capital markets. This is because the use of outside financing requires legal 
knowledge. For this reason, Pfeffer sees the appointment of lawyers to the board as a 
mechanism to extract resources from the environment, particularly if the firm is nationally 
regulated and going public. This phenomenon is referred to as Resource Dependence 
Capabilities.   
Many of the regulatory and resource problems biotech firms face are decided in 
Washington D.C. For example, the level of the National Institute of Health’s (NIH) funding 
to research institutes in different geographic areas could affect the quality of technology 
transfers to biotech companies. Another example is the landmark decisions reached by the 
federal judiciary. These rulings clarify contentious patent issues and change the fortunes of 
many biotech companies.   
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Due to national regulation, many biotech companies join sector-specific lobbying 
organizations that can represent their interests on a national level. Such organizations include 
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), Biotechnology 
Industry Organization (BIO), The Medical Device Manufacturers Association (MDMA), and 
National Venture Capital Association (NVAC). These organizations' activities include 
lobbying for more NIH funding and lobbying for capping product and professional liability 
claims. 
Consequently, corporate elites trained in regulatory and legal affairs on a biotech 
firm’s corporate board are very important. Apart from this, the resource dependence 
perspective suggests that the extraction of resources from the environment or a strategy of 
cooptation is a subtle, low-risk corporate strategy. The management of resource dependence 
capabilities, through informal alliances with key players in Washington, that are not required 
to be filed in SEC documents, allows an organization to stabilize cash flow resources without 
informational impact on stock prices. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
H4: Resource dependence capabilities, which we define as the number of corporate elites 
trained in regulatory and legal affairs as a proportion of the number of corporate 
elites, are negatively associated with idiosyncratic volatility.    
 
III. Data and Method 
  
We collect the data for our study from SDC, CRSP, and IPO prospectuses. IPO 
prospectuses have been available on the SEC's EDGAR database since May 1996, therefore, 
our sample period is from May 1, 1996 to Dec 31, 2001. To be included in our sample, a firm 
must be recorded as a biotech company in SDC, its IPO prospectus must be available on 
EDGAR, and it must have stock return information in CRSP for more than 240 trading days 
from the IPO date. These criteria result in 182 companies for our study. Among them, 159 
firms went public on Nasdaq, and the remaining 23 went public on NYSE/AMEX. To avoid 
the possible heterogeneity of firms listed on different exchanges, we focus on the 159 firms 
that went public on Nasdaq. 
  
A. Compute the Dependent Variable: Idiosyncratic Volatility 
To obtain idiosyncratic volatility, we follow the direct decomposition method of Xu 
and Malkiel (2003), using residuals from a factor model. Xu and Malkiel find that this 
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approach yields more conservative estimates relative to the indirect decomposition method 
used in Campbell et al.  
Wagner (2003) and Spiegel and Wang (2005) suggest the use of a GARCH approach 
to calculate idiosyncratic volatility. We choose the GARCH (1,1) model and run it separately 
for each firm. We do this to ensure that the GARCH conditional variances of individual firms 
are not contaminated by cross-sectional firm effects.     
Our first step is to construct the value-weighted industry return using all Nasdaq-listed 
biotech firms. Next, we regress the industry return against the value-weighted market return 
in the following equation: 
itmtimiit RR εβα ++=        (1) 
 
where we denote the industry return as itR , and the market return as mtR . The outcome is the 
industry return residual, itε . Then, using itε  as an independent variable, we estimate the 
following GARCH model: 
jititjimtimjijit eRR +++= εββα        (2) 
     hjit =  Cji + e2jit-1 +  hjit-1     (3) 
 
where jitR  denotes the firm j’s return in the industry i, which is the biotech industry in our 
case, for the time, t. We denote the GARCH conditional variance as hjjt. The average of hjjt 
over time is our measure of idiosyncratic volatility for the firm j in the biotech industry. 
 We group our independent variables into four categories: (1) the variables that are 
proxies for managerial characteristics; (2) the variables that are proxies for resource 
dependence capabilities; (3) CEO stock options variables; and (4) control variables. The 
variables in the first three groups are our experimental variables for hypothesis testing. 
 
B. Managerial Characteristics 
 We use the CEO's age as our proxy for the CEO’s risk aversion. An alternative 
measure is the average age of board members. The Founder-CEO Dummy is our proxy for 
our management style variable. We obtain the data for these variables from IPO prospectuses. 
We review the career histories of the corporate elites covered in the IPO prospectuses and 
count their total number to compute our measure of the number of corporate elites. We code 
 8
the Founder-CEO as one when the career history indicates that the CEO is also the founder, 
and zero otherwise. 
 
C. Resource Dependence Capabilities 
We construct two resource dependence capability proxies. RDep1 is the number of 
corporate elites trained in legal and regulatory affairs as a proportion of the total number of 
corporate elites. RDep2 is the number of regulatory elites trained in patents and clinical trials 
management as a proportion of the total number of corporate elites. Since most biotech firms 
depend on patents and FDA product approvals, a subset of the regulatory elites, i.e., the 
regulatory elites experienced in patents and clinical trials management, can use their expertise 
to reduce the firm’s risk in this specific aspect. The finer measure (RDep2) does not 
invalidate the broader measure (RDep1). Rather, it serves as an alternative proxy. 
 
D. Stock Options 
To test the hypothesis for stock options, from the IPO prospectuses we collect data on 
the CEO's salary, the value of the CEO's stock options, and the value of the CEO’s bonus. 
This information allows us to compute our measure of the CEO’s stock-based compensation, 
Option, which is the value of stock options divided by the CEO’s total compensation, the sum 
of stock options, salary, and bonus.  
The CEO’s total compensation is a mix of forward- and backward-looking items. As a 
result, it may not be appropriate. We do not standardize the option value by the post-IPO 
market capitalization, because the measure would then produce a significant bias against 
firms with large market capitalization. Given that we compute the stock option value based 
on the fixed 5% price appreciation assumption, the larger the market capitalization (due to the 
higher stock price), the lower would be the option proxy value standardized by the market 
capitalization, which is counter-intuitive. In addition, the option value provided in an IPO 
prospectus is based on SEC Regulation S-K, which requires that the value of the stock 
options awarded in the previous year be reported, assuming both 5% and 10% price 
appreciation. Although we use the 5% assumption, we find that it is still overly optimistic. At 
the end of the first year after the IPO, only 38% of our sample firms have an annualized price 
appreciation exceeding 5%. The corresponding percentages of firms with an annualized 
growth rate exceeding 5% at the end of years two, three, four, and five are 31%, 14%, 21%, 
and 18%, respectively. The median annual growth rate is negative from year one to year five 
after the IPO. To avoid problems that might be caused by standardizing the option value by 
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the CEO’s total compensation and by the unrealistic 5% annual growth rate assumption, we 
create an alternative proxy, Option Dummy. This proxy takes the value of one if a firm has 
CEO stock options, and zero otherwise.       
 
E. Control Variables 
One important variable to control is the growth prospects of IPO firms. The older the 
firm is upon listing, the lower the growth prospects and the lower the idiosyncratic volatility 
(Xu and Malkiel, 2003). Megginson and Weiss (1991) also support the use of the firm age as 
a reverse proxy for growth prospects. Thus, we use the log of the firm age as a reverse proxy 
for growth prospects. We calculate firm age as the difference between the founding date, as 
documented in the IPO prospectus, and the listing date, converted into years. We obtain these 
dates from the SDC. Due to the fact that the data on the founding dates are incomplete, we 
collect part of the data from IPO prospectuses.  
This proxy may also capture the firm-specific information. The older the firm, the 
more firm-specific information might be available to the public. Since higher idiosyncratic 
volatility implies that more information is impounded into stock prices, it is possible to find a 
positive relation between idiosyncratic volatility and the firm age. 
Previous authors have found that idiosyncratic volatility is correlated with firm size, 
analysts' earnings growth estimates, earnings or profitability, and the variance of earnings. As 
our study focuses on biotech IPO firms, many of the above-mentioned variables are 
unavailable, and, for this reason, cannot be used in our analyses. For example, analysts' 
earnings growth estimates are unavailable for our IPO sample. Many firms in our sample do 
not report total assets in their prospectuses, and more than half of the firms do not have 
positive earnings before their IPO. Therefore, it is difficult to use financial information such 
as total assets or net income as controls for size and profitability in our regressions. In 
addition, because there is no quarterly disclosure requirement for private firms, we have only 
three pre-IPO yearly observations for each firm. It is not meaningful to compute the variance 
of any earnings proxies with only three observations.  
We also note that because there is so little information available for IPO firms, 
especially for high-tech IPO firms, we wish to examine if managerial characteristics, which 
are available for all IPO firms, can help predict idiosyncratic volatility for biotech IPO firms. 
Cao, Simin, and Zhao (2006) demonstrate that the explanatory power of profitability and firm 
age disappears after they control for growth options. Therefore, we do not include earnings, 
earnings variability, and size, in our regressions.  
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F. Model Specification 
Our baseline cross-sectional regression model is: 
Volatility = β0 + β1lnFirmage + β2FounderCEO + β3lnCEOage + β4Rdep + β5Option 
+ Listing Year Dummies + ε        (4) 
where  
Volatility   = Idiosyncratic volatility, 240 trading days (one year) after the IPO. 
ln(FirmAge)    =  The natural log of the firm age, which is a  reverse proxy for growth 
prospects.  
FounderCEO   = Dummy variable for the founder-CEO that is our proxy for the founder's 
management style. It takes the value of one if the CEO is also the 
founder of the firm, and zero otherwise. 
ln(CEOAge)    =  The natural log of the CEO age that is our proxy for management risk 
aversion. 
ln(BoardAge)    = The natural log of the average age of board members, which we use as 
an alternative proxy for management risk aversion.  
RDep          = RDep1 represents the number of corporate elites trained in legal and 
regulatory affairs as a proportion of the number of corporate elites. 
Rdep2 is the number of regulatory elites trained in patents and clinical 
trials management as a proportion of the total number of corporate 
elites.  
Option         =  The value of CEO stock options divided by the CEO’s total 
compensation.  
Option Dummy  =  Takes the value of one if a firm has CEO stock options, and zero 
otherwise.     
Four Listing Year Dummies for 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000 control for possible year specific 
effects. 
 
We use WLS because we have the heteroskedasticity problem when using OLS. 
[Insert Table I here] 
Table I presents the summary statistics of all the relevant variables. Several 
observations are particularly noteworthy: First, the mean and median of the idiosyncratic 
volatility are not much smaller than the corresponding mean and median of total volatility. 
This pattern indicates that more firm-specific information is incorporated into stock prices. 
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Second, 53% of our sample firms issue CEO stock options. As an average, the option value is 
39% of the CEO’s total compensation in the previous year. The maximum of 99.99% 
indicates that the CEO’s compensation consists almost solely of options. Third, the average 
firm age is 6.8 years, and the average ages of both CEOs and board are around 48. Finally, 
RDep1, the average number of corporate elites trained in legal and regulatory affairs as a 
proportion of the number of corporate elites in the firm, is about 7% or 0.91 regulatory elite 
per firm. The board size in our sample ranges from five to 29, with a mean of 12.56. The 
range of regulatory elites for both Rdep1 and Rdep2 is zero to four. However, for RDep2, the 
regulatory elite per firm is only 0.52. All variables have a reasonably wide range across 
sample firms. 
[Insert Table II here] 
Table II presents the Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix between the variables 
used in Equation (4). Among the independent variables, the correlation coefficients are 
generally low and not significantly different from zero. The exceptions are the correlation 
coefficients between RDep1 and RDep2, 0.72; Option and Option Dummy, 0.87; and 
Ln(CEOAge) and Ln(BoardAge), 0.39. All three variables are significant at the 5% level. We 
note that we do not include any of these pairs in the same regression. Therefore, 
multicollinearity is not a serious problem in our regression analyses. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
 
We first regress idiosyncratic volatility on the control variable, Ln(FirmAge), and 
then on the control variable plus one experimental variable at a time. We report the results in 
Table III, which contains eight models. To save space, although they are included in all 
regression models, we do not report the listing-year dummies.  
Model 1 includes only Ln(FirmAge). The positive, significant value for Ln(FirmAge) 
is not consistent with Xu and Malkiel (2003), who find that idiosyncratic volatility is 
positively associated with the growth prospects. Due to the fact that Ln(FirmAge) is a reverse 
proxy for growth prospects, it should be negatively associated with idiosyncratic volatility. 
We note that the firm age might also be a proxy for the availability of firm-specific 
information. The older the firm, the more firm-specific information might be available to the 
public. Since higher idiosyncratic volatility implies that more information is impounded into 
stock prices, it is possible to find a positive relation between idiosyncratic volatility and 
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Ln(FirmAge). The adjusted R2 is 0.143 and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.056, indicating 
that there is no first-order autocorrelation. 
[Insert Table III here] 
 Models 2 through 8 include the control variable plus one experimental variable each. 
These regressions provide a clear picture of how each of our new experimental variables adds 
to the explanatory power of idiosyncratic volatility beyond the control variable. Several 
observations are obvious:  
First, the impact of our control variable, Ln(FirmAge), is positive and significant 
across all these models, irrespective of which experimental variable we add. 
Second, except for Founder-CEO and Ln(CEOAge), all other experimental proxies 
are significant and have the expected sign. The nonsignificant estimate for Founder-CEO in 
Model 2 is neither consistent with our hypothesis, H3, that the founder-CEO tends to take 
more risk and thus increases idiosyncratic risk, nor consistent with H3a, that the founder-
CEO tends to disclose less information and thus decreases idiosyncratic risk. The positive, 
significant estimates for Ln(BoardAge) in Model 3 is not consistent with H2 but is consistent 
with H2a. This suggests that the more experienced the leadership of a firm, the more 
confidently it initiates strategic changes.  
The estimates for both resource dependency proxies in Models 5 and 6 are 
significantly negative. This supports H4, that a high proportion of corporate elites with legal 
and regulatory affairs backgrounds leads to lower idiosyncratic volatility.  
The positive and significant estimates for two stock option proxies in Models 7 and 8 
are consistent with H1, that CEO stock options tend to increase idiosyncratic volatility. 
Especially, the significant estimate for Option Dummy lends strong support to H1. This is 
because Option Dummy does not require any option value estimation and standardization, 
which may cause various biases.  
Third, the adjusted R2 is higher in Models 2 through 8 than it is in the Model 1. This 
indicates that our new experimental variables add explanatory power to the model. The 
largest increment is associated with Ln(BoardAge), which rises about 5.5 percentage points 
to 19.8% The second largest results from Option, which rises more than five percentage 
points to 19.3%. The smallest increments are associated with Founder-CEO and 
Ln(CEOAge), only 0.5 and 0.1 percentage points, respectively. We note that this is 
understandable, because the estimates of both Founder-CEO and Ln(CEOAge) are not 
statistically significant in the first place. Finally, the Durbin-Watson statistics are all close to 
two, indicating that there is no autocorrelation in these regressions. 
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We progressively add more experimental variables until we have included all 
experimental variables in the regression. Table IV reports the results. Model 1 includes 
Ln(FirmAge) plus Founder-CEO and Ln(BoardAge). Model 2 also includes the first proxy 
for resource dependency, Rdep1. Models 3 and 4 include the additional variables Option and 
Option Dummy, respectively. Models 5 to 7 repeat Models 2 to 4 with the second proxy for 
resource dependency, Rdep2, in place of Rdep1.  
 [Insert Table IV here] 
 The results in Table IV are consistent with what we observe in Table III. When we 
expand the model to include more experimental variables, they are mostly significant and 
have the expected sign. The estimate for the firm age is still significant for Models 1 and 2, 
but marginally nonsignificant for Models 3 to 7. Second, the results are robust across 
different proxies for resource dependency (Rdep1 and Rdep2) and the stock options (Option 
and Option Dummy). Third, the adjusted R2 increases progressively as we add more 
experimental variables in the regression. The adjusted R2 is 19.2% for Model 1, but 22.1% 
when we add Rdep1 to Model 2.  It further increases to 26.3% or 25.7% when we include 
Option or Option Dummy in Model 3 or Model 4. We observe similar patterns for Models 5 
to 7 when we replace Rdep1 with Rdep2. Relative to Model 1 in Table III, which only 
includes ln(FirmAge), the increase in explanatory power is obvious when we add managerial 
characteristics, resource dependence capabilities, and stock options variables. Fourth, Durbin-
Watson statistics are still generally close to two. 
 We repeat the Table IV regressions with Ln(CEOAge) instead of Ln(BoardAge). The 
results, which we report in Table V, are consistent with the ones shown in Table IV. We note 
that Ln(CEOAge) is  nonsignificant in all models. This NOUN is consistent with the Model 
4 regression results in Table III, where Ln(CEOAge) is positive but not  significant. 
[Insert Table V here] 
Overall, our results in Tables III, IV, and V provide strong evidence that CEO stock 
options, resource dependency, and the management’s age, help predict idiosyncratic volatility 
for IPO firms in the biotech industry.     
We also include the three-year average prelisting gross earnings over total sales, a 
proxy for profitability, and the natural log of the one-year average after market capitalization, 
which is a proxy for size, in the regressions. However, they are statistically nonsignificant. 
We observe that when we use the natural log of the number of employees at the listing date as 
an alternative proxy for the firm size, we find a significantly negative relation between the 
proxy and the idiosyncratic volatility. This, in turn, suggests that size has a negative impact 
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on idiosyncratic volatility. These results are not directly comparable to those of the Paster and 
Veronesi (2003), Xu and Malkiel (2003), and Wei and Zhang (2006) studies, because our 
proxies are different from theirs. We note that whether or not we include these variables has 
no material impact on our overall results. Thus, we do not report them here.   
Since there are alternative ways to compute idiosyncratic volatility, we check if our 
results are sensitive to the alternative idiosyncratic volatility measures. To do this, we 
recompute the idiosyncratic volatility with the asset-pricing model used in Durnev, Morck, 
Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) and the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model. Next, we repeat 
all the regressions with the two alternative measures of idiosyncratic volatility. The results 
are largely the same. Therefore, our findings on managerial characteristics, resource 




Because idiosyncratic volatility is so important in asset pricing, capital allocation and 
linking macroeconomics and microeconomics, many authors have investigated the possible 
determinants of idiosyncratic volatility. Building on these studies and the Upper Echelon 
theory, we use a sample of IPO firms in the biotech industry to test whether or not some 
easily identifiable managerial characteristics, such as the CEO age, Founder-CEO status, and 
the proportion of corporate elites with legal and regulatory background, help predict 
idiosyncratic volatility.  We also empirically test whether or not CEO stock options have 
any impact on idiosyncratic volatility. 
We have four major findings: (1) Stock options are positively related to idiosyncratic 
volatility, which is consistent with Campbell et al., (2001) prediction. (2) Resource 
dependency has a strong negative impact on the idiosyncratic volatility of biotech firms, 
which are nationally regulated. (3) The age of board members tends to positively affect 
idiosyncratic volatility. This finding does not support the common belief that young 
managers are more aggressive, but is consistent with the prediction by Golden and Zajac 
(2001), that experienced managers dare to take bigger risks and impel strategic changes in the 
company. (4) The Founder-CEO status does not have much impact on idiosyncratic volatility. 
These findings are robust across different idiosyncratic volatility measures and alternative 
proxies for control and experimental variables. 
Overall, stock options and some easily identifiable managerial characteristics help 
predict a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility. These findings may have direct implications for 
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investors who are sensitive to idiosyncratic volatility, fund managers, and researchers 
interested in idiosyncratic volatility determinants. 
We note that we base our study only on IPO firms in the biotech industry. A detailed 
study on IPO firms, either in all high-tech or all industries, is necessary before generalizing 
our conclusions on managerial characteristics and stock options. 
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Table I. Summary Statistics 
 
In this table, we define Total Volatility as the variance of returns for 240 trading days 
(roughly one year) after the IPO, and Idiosyncratic Volatility as the average of GARCH 
conditional variances for 240 trading days after the IPO. Firm Age is the difference between 
the listing date and the founding date; the log of firm age is our reverse proxy for growth 
prospects. Founder-CEO is a dummy variable coded as one if the CEO is also the founder, 
and zero otherwise. Board Age is the average age of the board members. CEOAge is the CEO 
age. The log of Board Age and the log of CEOAge are our proxies for managements’ attitude 
toward risk. Option is the value of CEO stock options divided by his/her total compensation. 
Option Dummy takes the value of one if the firm has CEO options, and zero otherwise. 
RDep1 is the number of corporate elites trained in legal and regulatory affairs as a proportion 
of the number of corporate elites (senior managers and directors) in the firm. RDep2 is the 
number of corporate elites trained in patent and clinical trials management as a proportion of 
the number of corporate elites (senior managers and directors) in the firm.  
 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Total Volatility 0.0053 0.0047 0.0031 0.0011 0.0231 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.0051 0.0044 0.0036 0.0010 0.0269 
Firm Age 6.78 5.38 6.27 0.60 51.15 
Ln(Firmage) 1.6600 1.6818 0.7008 -0.5154 3.9347 
Founder-CEO 0.2515 0.0000 0.4352 0.0000 1.0000 
Board Age 48.44 48.23 3.58 39.63 60.71 
Ln(Board Age) 3.8776 3.8759 0.0731 3.6797 4.1061 
CEOAge 48.42 48.00 6.61 33.00 64.00 
Ln(CEOAge) 3.8704 3.8712 0.1383 3.4965 4.1588 
Stock Options Value ($) 1578999 88740 3647094 0 24122581 
Option 0.3892 0.2417 0.4126 0.0000 0.9999 
Option Dummy 0.5345 1.0000 0.5003 0.0000 1.0000 
Rdep-1 0.0684 0.0625 0.0747 0.0000 0.3076 
Rdep-2 0.0414 0.0000 0.0590 0.0000 0.3076 




Table II. Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
FirmAge is the log of the difference between the listing date and the founding date. RDep1 is the number of corporate elites trained in legal and 
regulatory affairs as a proportion of the number of corporate elites (senior managers and directors) in the firm. RDep2 is the number of corporate 
elites trained in patent and clinical trials management as a proportion of the number of corporate elites (senior managers and directors) in the 
firm. Founder equals one if the CEO is the founder of the company, and zero otherwise. BdAge is the log of the average age of the board 
members. CEOAge is the log of the CEO’s age. Option is the value of CEO stock options divided by his/her total compensation. OptionD is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm issues options to the CEO, and zero otherwise. 
 
 Idio_volatility FirmAge Rdep1 Rdep2 Founder BdAge CEOage Option 
FirmAge 0.18*        
Rdep-1 -0.19** -0.02       
Rdep-2 -0.14 -0.04 0.72**      
Founder -0.07 -0.07 0.05 -0.02     
BdAge 0.24** 0.17** 0.07 0.12 -0.10    
CEOAge 0.11 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.23* 0.39**   
Option 0.14* -0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.10 -0.02  
OptionD 0.15* -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.13 0.00 0.87** 
 





Table III. Regression Analysis: Control Variable plus Individual Experimental Variables 
 
The sample includes 159 biotech firms for the period 1996 to 2001. We perform WLS regressions of idiosyncratic volatility on experimental 
variables and control variables.  We multiply the dependent variable, 1st year idiosyncratic volatility, by 1,000. Ln(FirmAge) is our reverse 
proxy for growth prospects. Rdep1 (Rdep2) is the number of corporate elites trained in legal and regulatory affairs (patent and clinical trials 
management) as a proportion of the number of corporate elites (senior managers and directors) in the firm. Founder-CEO is a dummy variable 
coded as one if the CEO is also the founder, and zero otherwise. Ln(BoardAge) and Ln(CEOAge) are the alternative proxies for management’s 
attitude towards risks. Option is the value of CEO stock options divided by his/her total compensation. Option Dummy takes the value of one if 
the firm has CEO options, and zero otherwise. We report the t-value in parentheses below each estimated coefficient. We include listing-year 
dummies in all regressions to control for the possible year specific effect. However, to save space we do not report them here. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model7 Model8
Constant 2.14 2.80 -85.70 -29.07 5.85 5.04 0.22 0.13
  (0.76) (0.98) (-1.92)* (-1.03) (1.99)** (1.73)* (0.07) (0.04)
Ln(FirmAge) 3.18 3.10 2.73 3.07 2.74 2.74 2.98 2.86
  (2.11)** (2.06)** (1.80)* (2.04)** (1.88)* (1.86)* (1.99)** (1.89)*
Founder-CEO  -4.56  
   (-1.50)  
Ln(BoardAge)  22.67  
   (1.97)*  
Ln(CEOAge)  8.05  
   (1.12)  
Rdep-1  -45.91
   (-3.50)***
Rdep-2   -42.05
    (-3.08)***
Option   4.11
    (1.70)*
Option Dummy   3.57
    (1.66)*
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.16
DW 2.06 2.07 2.10 2.08 2.09 2.11 2.05 2.11
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
 
Table IV.  Regression Analysis: Control Variable plus All Experimental Variables [with Ln(BoardAge)] 
 
The sample includes 159 biotech firms for the period 1996 to 2001. We perform WLS regressions of idiosyncratic volatility on experimental 
variables and a set of control variables.  We multiply the dependent variable, 1st year idiosyncratic volatility, by 1,000. Ln(FirmAge) is our 
reverse proxy for growth prospects.  Rdep1 (Rdep2) is the number of corporate elites trained in legal and regulatory affairs (patent and clinical 
trials management) as a proportion of the number of corporate elites (senior managers and directors) in the firm. Founder-CEO is a dummy 
variable coded as one if the CEO is also the founder, and zero otherwise. Ln(BoardAge) and Ln(CEOAge) are the alternative proxies for 
management’s attitude towards risks. Option is the value of CEO stock options divided by his/her total compensation. Option Dummy takes the 
value of one if the firm has CEO options, and zero otherwise. We report the t-value in parentheses below each estimated coefficient. We include 
listing-year dummies in all regressions to control for the possible year specific effect. However, to save space we do not report them here. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant -77.11 -81.96 -92.33 -100.61 -90.96 -100.00 -109.51 
  (-1.71)* (-1.88)* (-2.15)** (-2.30)** (-2.08)** (-2.30)** (-2.49)** 
Ln(Firmage) 2.70 2.20 1.83 1.68 2.11 1.81 1.59 
  (1.79)* (1.65)* (1.57) (1.45) (1.64) (1.54) (1.39) 
Founder-CEO -3.78 -3.71 -3.89 -3.97 -4.36 -4.53 -4.62 
  (-1.24) (-1.27) (-1.35) (-1.37) (-1.48) (-1.56) (-1.59) 
Ln(BoardAge) 20.59 22.83 24.90 26.98 25.03 26.79 29.16 
  (1.77)* (2.04)** (2.26)** (2.41)** (2.22)** (2.40)** (2.58)** 
Rdep-1  -47.38 -51.91 -48.21    
   (-3.66)*** (-4.04)*** (-3.77)***    
Rdep-2     -47.18 -48.87 -47.84 
     (-3.49)*** (-3.65)*** (-3.58)* 
Option   5.83   5.03  
    (2.53)**   (2.18)**  
Option Dummy    4.72   4.67 
    (2.29)**   (2.26)** 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.23 
DW 2.11 2.16 2.12 2.22 2.20 2.17 2.26 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table V. Regression Analysis: Control Variable plus All Experimental Variables [with Ln(CEOAge)] 
 
The sample includes 182 biotech firms for the period 1996 to 2001. We perform WLS regressions of idiosyncratic volatility on experimental 
variables and a set of control variables.  We multiply the dependent variable, 1st year idiosyncratic volatility, by 1,000. Ln(FirmAge) is our 
reverse proxy for growth prospects. Rdep1 (Rdep2) is the number of corporate elites trained in legal and regulatory affairs (patent and clinical 
trials management) as a proportion of the number of corporate elites (senior managers and directors) in the firm. Founder-CEO is a dummy 
variable coded as one if the CEO is also the founder, and zero otherwise. Ln(BoardAge) and Ln(CEOAge) are the alternative proxies for 
management’s attitude towards risks. Option is the value of CEO stock options divided by his/her total compensation. Option Dummy takes the 
value of one if the firm has CEO options, and zero otherwise. We report the t-value in parentheses below each estimated coefficient. We include 
listing-year dummies in all regressions to control for the possible year specific effect. However, to save space we do not report them here. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant -20.80 -12.40 -7.33 -9.98 -21.86 -18.32 -19.65 
  (-0.72) (-0.44) (-0.26) (-0.36) (-0.78) (-0.66) (-0.70) 
Ln(Firmage) 3.02 2.60 2.33 2.26 2.54 2.32 2.21 
  (2.01)** (1.78)* (1.65)* (1.55) (1.73)* (1.62) (1.59) 
Founder-CEO -4.04 -4.15 -4.54 -4.59 -4.64 -4.97 -5.05 
  (-1.30) (-1.39) (-1.54) (-1.54) (-1.54) (-1.66)* (-1.68)* 
Ln(CEOAge) 6.07 4.85 3.01 3.70 7.16 5.74 6.07 
  (0.82) (0.68) (0.42) (0.52) (0.99) (0.80) (0.85) 
Rdep-1  -45.51 -49.69 -46.06    
   (-3.47)*** (-3.80)*** (-3.54)***    
Rdep-2     -44.43 -45.59 -44.42 
     (-3.26)*** (-3.37)*** (-3.28)*** 
Option   5.33   4.43  
    (2.27)**   (1.89)*  
Option Dummy    3.82   3.65 
     (1.84)*   (1.75)* 
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.22 016 0.20 0.19 
DW 2.08 2.12 2.07 2.15 2.15 2.12 2.19 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
